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Abstract 
This paper provides a regression analysis of the debt ratio of project-financed LNG infrastructures and 
gas pipeline projects, by using data relating to projects whose financial close occurred between June 2004 
and March 2011. The projects located in risky countries tend to exhibit lower debt ratios, which is 
consistent with the basic view of risk-averse funds suppliers. However, surprisingly enough, the more 
concentrated the equity ownership, the lower the debt ratio. 
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1. Introduction 
Like other capital-intensive infrastructures, LNG infrastructures and gas pipeline projects are usually 
funded through project finance. This specialised form of debt finance involves lending to a project 
company set up for the sole purpose of developing an individual project. The debt has to be repaid from 
the cash flows generated by the project, and debtholders have only a limited recourse back to the 
corporate sponsors of the project. A specific debt ratio can therefore be associated with each project, 
which is not the case for corporate-financed projects2 (i.e., projects financed on the owner's balance 
sheet).
In general, project finance seems an efficient way of maximizing debt financing - backed by the future 
project revenues - since empirical studies conclude that projects funded through project finance are highly 
1 * Corresponding author. Tel.: +47 735 93 767; fax: +47 735 97 250. 
E-mail address: simon.roussanaly@sintef.no . 
2
See Pierru [1] for an in-depth discussion of this issue in the upstream petroleum industry.
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leveraged. Shah and Thakor [2] invoke asymmetry of information to explain why project finance involves 
higher leverage than does conventional corporate financing. Brealey et al. [3] stress that project finance 
allows the allocation of specific project risks (i.e., completion and operating risks, price risks and 
geopolitical risks) to those parties best able to manage them. Furthermore, as stressed by Morrison [4], 
transnational gas pipeline sector is driven by geopolitics, but, once projects approved, project finance is 
an obvious funding option: "the schemes have high upfront costs, steady tariff payments during their 
lifetimes and many sponsors in the project company – all ideal conditions for project finance". 
However the financing mix of projects is susceptible to substantially vary with respect to the industrial 
sector considered. In this context, this paper provides some new empirical insights on the financing mix 
of LNG and gas pipeline projects, by using data relating to projects financed between June 2004 and 
March 2011 (based on their financial closure date). The analysis mainly focuses on the debt ratio 
observed for the projects considered. The following section offers a preliminary description of the 
projects considered, along with the rationale of the variables used. A statistical study is then achieved and 
the resulting empirical insights are discussed. 
2. Description of projects considered and rationale of variables used 
We have documented3 26 LNG or gas pipeline projects financed through project finance and whose date 
of financial close fell between 29 June 2004 (Egypt LNG Train 1) and 4 March 2011 (Nord Stream Phase 
2). Financial close implies the formal signing of financial documentation and the satisfaction of all 
conditions that are required to be satisfied before the borrower (i.e., the project) can request drawdown. 
Table A1 gives a detailed list of the 26 pipeline and LNG projects that form the sample. These gas 
infrastructure projects all involved the creation of capacity from scratch or the expansion of existing 
capacity (none involved a purely financial transaction such as refinancing or asset acquisition). The LNG 
projects, that involve the construction of liquefaction plants or regasification plants, may include the 
construction of associated storage tanks and pipeline4, but not shipping. We did not consider the financing 
of the shipping parts of LNG projects, insofar as ships can be lease-financed. The LNG carriers, which 
technically can easily be foreclosed and reallocated to other projects, are effectively “liquid” assets, 
unlike LNG infrastructure which is traditionally considered as specific asset5 [5]. As a result, in the 
shipping sector, debt ratios tend to be particularly high. 
For various reasons, several infrastructure projects financed after 2004 are not included in our sample. In 
particular, Rasgas 2-3 has been ruled out because of successive dates of financial close that could have 
been source of confusion. The Asia Trans Gas Pipeline, whose financial close occurred in 2008, was not 
considered either because we could not determine the accurate ownership syndicate structure. 
Furthermore, certain projects were financed on the sponsors' balance sheet and are therefore not 
considered here (since no specific debt financing can be associated with them). In particular, Rayong 
LNG Receiving Terminal (a $700 million investment in Thailand) was fully financed by the public 
company PTT, and EG LNG Train 1 (a $1.4 billion investment in Equatorial Guinea) as well as Angola 
LNG (a $4 billion investment in Angola) were fully corporate-financed by their sponsors. 
In our statistical study, we consider the following variables: 
3 Sources: CEDIGAZ, Wood McKenzie, IFPEN's Economic & Information Watch Department.
4 For instance, Peru LNG (2008) comprises a 408km pipeline to connect the liquefaction plant to an existing pipeline network east
of the Andes.
5 See Von Hirschhausen and Neumann for a recent analysis of this issue.
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2.1. Debt ratio 
In this paper, a project's debt ratio is computed as the ratio of the amount of senior debt to the project's 
total investment cost as anticipated at the date of financial close. Note however that, even after financial 
close, a project's financing can still be subject to modifications - in compliance with existing debt 
covenants, like thresholds of debt-service cover ratios - if new market conditions are favorable. In 
addition, if unexpected additional investment costs are incurred, subordinated debt may be issued during 
construction. The senior debt may comprise bank debt (including from development banks and export 
credit agencies6), bonds, sponsor loans7 and Islamic financing8.
2.2. Concentration of equity ownership 
As stressed by Esty [6], project-finance companies generally exhibit highly-concentrated equity 
ownership, with syndicates typically formed of two or three sponsoring firms. Esty and Megginson [7] 
suggest that, in project finance, more concentrated ownership of equity reduces agency costs through 
better incentives alignment and oversight of managers by owners. As a consequence, projects with higher 
equity ownership concentration may have higher debt ratios. In a consistent way, a diluted equity 
ownership may reveal that sponsors consider the project as especially risky. In this paper, the 
concentration of equity ownership is measured as the Herfindahl index of the project, as suggested by 
Vaaler et al. [8]. This index corresponds to the sum of the square of each sponsor equity share in the 
project.
2.3. Date of financial close 
The economic and financial crisis of 2008 had a major impact on the energy industry [9] and the gas 
industry in particular [10]: falling demand and prices, a credit crunch, etc. Nevertheless, the effect of the 
crisis on the financing mix of gas infrastructure projects may be ambiguous. Clearly, the global credit 
crunch should lead to a reduction in debt ratios. However, there are arguments in favour of an opposite 
effect of the economic crisis. Indeed, at a time of relatively low natural gas prices and, more broadly, an 
increasingly negative economic outlook, companies may be tempted to increase the share of debt in the 
financing for these projects - especially as interest rates remain low - in order to increase the profitability 
of the invested equity capital. 
In this paper, we assume that the projects whose financing could have been affected by the crisis were 
those with a financial-close date after 15 September 2008 (i.e., after Lehman Brothers went bankrupt). 
The corresponding explanatory variable is a 0-1 dummy variable (equal to 1 if the project financial close 
is post-crisis). 
2.4. Country risk 
Projects located in risky countries may have smaller debt ratios - as senior lenders may want to limit their 
risk exposure and demand stricter conditions. The country risk to consider here is that perceived by 
investors at the project's date of financial close. This variable is equal to the OECD rating for the risk of 
6 These financial institutions guarantee loan tranches or make direct loans.
7 A sponsor loan is a loan made to the project by one or several project's sponsors (i.e., the SPV shareholders). When a sponsor also 
supplies some senior debt, relationships amongst lenders are potentially more complex.
8 For instance in the Dolphin Energy Project.
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country9 at the date of the financial close. For a transnational pipeline, the rating considered is equal to 
the maximum rating over all countries crossed by the pipeline. For the projects considered here, this 
variable ranges between 0 and 6 (Yemen LNG, Accugas Pipeline). 
2.5. Size of the project 
An industrial firm that diversifies its portfolio of assets will tend to take smaller stakes in larger projects. 
As a consequence, larger projects may therefore have more diluted equity ownerships. In addition, as 
stressed by Ghemewat [11], larger projects represent harder-to-reverse commitments (if poorly 
implemented), whereas smaller projects may be considered as easier to reverse or liquidate upon project 
company failure. Larger projects may therefore also have lower debt ratios. In our sample, the largest 
project is Sakhalin 2 with an investment of $20 billion, the smallest is Gate LNG expansion with a total 
investment cost of $208 million. The explanatory variable Project Size is the natural logarithm of the total 
investment cost. 
2.6. Type of infrastructure 
Distinct types of infrastructure - possibly with differing idiosyncratic risk exposures- might have different 
debt ratios or equity ownership structures. In this respect, the 26 projects surveyed fall into three types of 
infrastructure: pipelines (10 projects), liquefaction plants (9 projects) and regasification terminals (7 
projects). We consider a 0-1 dummy variable for liquefaction plants and another dummy variable for 
regasification plants. 
Table 1 gives a synthetic view of the sample of projects under study. 
Table 1. Number of projects (total investment cost in brackets, in billion US dollars) 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
Pipeline 3 (5.6) 7 (19.8) 
Liquefaction 8 (47.8) 1 (18.2) 
Regasification 6 (6.8) 1 (0.2) 
3. Preliminary remarks on the evolution of investments and loans 
In our sample, as Figure 1 indicates, the number of projects by type of infrastructure is relatively variable 
from one year to the next. Between 2005 and 2007, a decline in the number of projects was observed for 
all types of infrastructure (with no pipeline projects in 2006 and 2007). From 2008 on, the number of 
pipeline projects follows a continuous growth10, while a high number of LNG projects has been financed 
in 2008. The subsequent small number of LNG projects may be attributable to factors other than the 2008 
9 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/12/35483246.pdf. This rating index is relevant for long-term projects like those considered 
here.
10 Apart from economic considerations, physical constraints may explain some of the investment in new capacity, as the IEA [12] 
observes: "part of the incremental pipeline capacity that is being built is designed to substitute for, rather than supplement, existing 
capacity: this is especially the case with new Russian export lines to Europe. Also, the availability of gas to supply some existing
pipelines, to which they are dedicated, will tend to fall as the source fields mature and production declines".
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crisis, such as the outlook for growth in unconventional gas in importing countries, especially in North 
America. The year 2011 is shown as a dotted line since it only includes projects with a financial closure 
date prior to April 2011. 
Figure 1. Number of projects by type of infrastructure 
Figure 2 shows the variations in the total amount invested in each type of project, along with the 
corresponding total amounts borrowed. The shape of these curves resembles Figure 1. Baker et al. [13] 
consider that the total global single-project capacity of the commercial-bank market is probably stuck 
around $3 billion for the foreseeable future. However, the aggregate global capacity of ECAs and 
development banks has benefited from the Chinese government's willingness to provide large amounts of 
capital to projects that commit substantial portions of their production to Chinese buyers (e.g., PNG LNG 
Phase I, Asia Trans Gas Pipeline). The size of LNG projects has nevertheless increased, the projects 
undertaken being more and more large and complex, a trend that might continue in the future. 
Figure 2. Evolution of invested and borrowed amounts 
4. Descriptive analysis of debt ratios  
According to Dailami and Leipziger [14], in project finance in general, a typical financing mix consists of 
20% to 40% equity (provided by project promoters) and the rest raised as debt. The average debt ratio is 
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67% according to Kleimeier and Megginson [15] and 71% according to Esty [16]. Megginson [17] finds 
that in 2009 debt financing accounted for 81% of the total project-finance volumes versus 19% equity 
funding. Here, when considering all the 26 projects, the mean debt ratio11  amounts to 69% and is 
consequently in line with the above values. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of Debt ratio per type of 
infrastructure. 
      
Figure 3. Projects classified by quantile of debt ratio 
By type of infrastructure, the average debt ratio is 0.68 for pipeline projects, 0.57 for liquefaction 
projects, and 0.84 for regasification projects. To draw definite conclusions is however difficult, since 
these differences in average debt ratios may result from various possible reasons: a higher proportion of 
expansion or pre-crisis projects for a given type of infrastructure, different geographical distributions (for 
instance most liquefaction projects are located in sub-investment-grade countries).  
5. Regression analysis 
Here, the small number of projects under consideration does not allow us to distinguish the impact of the 
regasification dummy variable from that of the country-risk variable. As a matter of fact, all but one12
regasification projects are located in countries displaying an OECD rating equal to zero, and the majority 
of the projects located in countries with a rating of zero are regasification projects. More generally, to 
explain the debt ratio, we tested various alternative specifications where coefficients of the project size 
and dummies for post-crisis or type of infrastructure never appeared significant at a 5% level. As a result, 
for descriptive purposes, we propose the regression presented in Equation (1), in which the debt ratio of 
the project i located in the country j is the dependent variable.  
             ௜ൌȽͲ൅Ƚͳή௝൅Ƚʹή௜൅ɂ௜                  (1) 
                   
In this regression, the country risk – such as perceived at the financial close date of project i – and 
Ownership concentration of project i are the explanatory variables of the project debt ratio. ɂ௜  is the 
disturbance, assumed to be independently and identically normally distributed. It can be noted that 
11
By regressing the debt amount with respect to the investment cost, Figure A1 offers an alternative view of the average debt ratio
that is then 0.54 over the full sample, but 0.73 if the project Sakhalin 2 is not considered.
12 The only exception is GNL Quintero whose financial close occurred when the OECD rating for Chile was 2.
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the country risk and the concentration of equity ownership exhibit a relatively low degree of collinearity, 
with a correlation coefficient of -0.38 (see also Figure A2). As shown in Table 2, all estimated 
coefficients are significant. The Durbin-Watson statistics shows that the null hypothesis of zero auto-
correlation in the residuals is not rejected at both 1% and 5% levels of significance. The null hypothesis 
of a normal distribution of the residuals is not rejected by the Jarque-Bera test at a 5% significance level. 
The sign of the estimated coefficients in Table 2 shows that the more risky is the country where the 
project is located, the smaller is the project's debt ratio. However, surprisingly enough, the more 
concentrated the equity ownership, the lower the debt ratio (see also Figure A3 for further illustration). 
By studying Asian project finance in general, Vaaler et al. [8] find the opposite result: projects with more 
concentrated ownership see higher financial leverage. Our result also seems to contradict Esty and 
Megginson's [7] suggestion that a more concentrated equity ownership should reduce agency costs. Other 
factors, with opposite effects, may explain our result: for instance, a diluted equity ownership may ensure 
the involvement of sponsors with previous experience in the same type of project (and therefore increase 
the lenders' appetite for the project's debt). Finally, according to the constant estimated in Table 2, a 
project located in a riskless country with a large number of sponsors (i.e., a near-zero Herfindahl index) 
would have a debt ratio close to 0.94. 
Table 2.  Regression coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) 
Coefficient Value 
Constant (ȽͲ)
0.94*** 
(0.09) 
Country risk (Ƚͳ)
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
Ownership Concentration (Ƚʹ)
-0.31** 
(0.12) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.23 
Durbin-Watson statistics 2.20 
 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
6. Conclusion 
This paper makes some empirical observations based on the financing of recent LNG and gas pipeline 
projects. Thus, the projects located in risky countries tend to exhibit lower debt ratios. This seems 
consistent with the basic view of risk-averse funds suppliers. Surprisingly enough, a more concentrated 
equity ownership is associated with a lower debt ratio, which seems to contradict Esty and Megginson's 
[7] suggestion that a more concentrated equity ownership should reduce agency costs. However, all these 
findings have to be considered with precaution: the dummy variables for the type of infrastructure and the 
2008 crisis may not have a significant effect because of the small number of projects considered (and not 
because they really have no effect). Furthermore, other factors, such as the unanticipated growth in non-
conventional gas, may also have played a role. Further investigations will have to be made in the future to 
interpret these results. 
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AppendixA 
Table A1. Gas transport projects 
Project 
Financial 
close date 
Infrastructure Country Debt ratio 
Herfindahl 
index of equity 
Egypt LNG Train 1 Jun-04 Liquefaction Egypt 0.85 0.28 
Sabine Pass LNG terminal feb-05 Regasification United States 0.80 1.00 
Cheyenne Plains Pipeline may-05 Pipeline United States 0.64 1.00 
Egypt LNG Train 2 jul-05 Liquefaction Egypt 0.80 0.32 
Dolphin Energy Jul-05 Pipeline 
Oman, Qatar 
UAE 
0.72 0.38 
Freeport LNG dec-05 Regasification United States 1.00 0.50 
Qatargas 3 dec-05 Liquefaction Qatar 0.70 0.56 
Atlantic LNG Cross Island 
Pipeline
dec-05 Pipeline 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
0.80 1.00 
Tangguh LNG aug-06 Liquefaction Indonesia 0.68 0.21 
Canaport LNG Terminal nov-06 Regasification Canada 0.69 0.63 
Qatargas 4 aug-07 Liquefaction Qatar 0.71 0.58 
Gulf LNG Clean Energy 
Terminal 
feb-08 Regasification United States 0.79 0.38 
Yemen LNG may-08 Liquefaction Yemen 0.58 0.23 
Sakhalin 2 jun-08 Liquefaction Russia 0.27 0.35 
GNL Quintero jun-08 Regasification Chile 0.85 0.28 
Peru LNG jun-08 Liquefaction Peru 0.54 0.34 
Gate LNG jul-08 Regasification Netherlands 0.94 0.33 
Southern Lights Pipeline sept-08 Pipeline 
Canada United 
States
0.71 1.00 
Gate LNG Expansion mar-09 Regasification Netherlands 0.85 0.33 
Elba Express expansion may-09 Pipeline United States 0.35 1.00 
Fayetteville Express Pipeline nov-09 Pipeline United States 0.82 0.50 
Nord Stream Phase I mar-10 Pipeline 
Russia
Germany 
0.71 0.32 
PNG LNG Phase I mar-10 Liquefaction 
Papua new 
Guinea
0.77 0.24 
Ruby Pipeline may-10 Pipeline United States 0.52 0.50 
Accugas Pipeline jun-10 Pipeline Nigeria 0.24 1.00 
Nord Stream Phase 2 mar-11 Pipeline 
Russia
Germany 
0.71 0.32 
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Figure A3. Debt ratio versus ownership concentration (per type of infrastructure)
